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and levies. Nigeria tax system has been 
weak due largely to inadequate data of the 
tax base and heavy reliance on oil revenue. 
With the volatility in oil prices and 
excruciating impacts of the recent global 
financial crisis, taxation deserves more 
attention now than ever before in Nigeria. 
One issue that is critical to domestic 
resource mobilization and utilization is the 
issue of fiscal federalism. Nigeria operates 
three tiers of government; Federal, State 
and Local Governments with separate 
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responsibilities each. However, all decisions 
including resources are controlled from the 
centre and the vertical revenue allocations 
tilt more towards the direction of federal 
government, contrary to the tenets of 
federalism the country is practicing. Both 
vertical and horizontal revenue in Nigeria 
is engulfed in controversy. 
The paper presents key issues, trend and 
challenges of taxation and fiscal federalism 
in Nigeria. In addition, the paper highlights 
a number of suggestions that would 
stimulate increase in tax revenue and 
guarantee fiscal assignment acceptable to 
the federal and sub-national government
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1. InTRODuCTIOn
The choice of whether a country becomes unitary system, confederation or 
a federation is a political decision. This political decision once made, have 
implications for political government, fiscal management and economic 
development as well as the attainment of social stability (Okunrounmu, 1996). 
According to Aigbokhan (1997), and Olowonomi (2000) the most feasible option 
of achieving an efficient public sector is fiscal decentralization. A very important 
goal of any government is efficient allocation of resources and efficient distribution 
of national wealth (Afolabi, 1999). Nigeria, after about 50 years of independent is 
still engulfed in the problem of how to share centrally generated revenue among 
the Local Governments, States and Federal Government. Another problem is 
how the revenue apportioned to the Local Governments and States can be shared 
among these aforementioned tiers of government. 
The volatility of oil production and revenue due to conflict in the Niger Delta 
Region plus the excruciating impact of the recent global financial crisis- with 
drop in commodity prices (including oil prices), aid flows and FDI respectively- 
makes it important to look deeper into alternative sources of development finance 
particularly taxation. Taxation is not only an effective tool to reduce Nigeria’s 
dependence on oil revenue but also dependence on aid from developing partners. 
With a population of about 150 million people, Nigeria has tremendous tax 
potentials that can guarantee reliable and uninterrupted revenue to government. 
Efficient and robust taxation system is the cornerstone to attaining the Nigeria’s 
ambition of becoming one of the most rapidly developing economies the world 
by 2020. 
This paper examines the twin issue of taxation and fiscal federalism in Nigeria. 
The paper took a cursory look at the topic during the pre and post independent 
period. Section one, is introductory section. The other parts of the paper are 
arranged as follows. Section two, examines Nigeria’s Tax System. While section 
three, contains a discussion on the Nigeria’s fiscal federalism, section four 
highlights expenditure assignment and revenue allocation in Nigeria. Section 
five examines the challenges facing revenue allocation in Nigeria. Finally, section 
six contains the study conclusion and policy recommendation.Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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2. nIgERIA’S TAx SYSTEm
2.1 Tax Type and Tax Jurisdiction
The assignments of fiscal instrument in Nigeria were guided by constitutional 
provision. The federal constitution gave the federal government exclusive power 
to collect levies like customs and excise, company tax, education tax and mining 
rents, VAT etc. All these revenues (with the exception of education tax) are paid 
into the federation account for distribution among the three tiers of government 
in line with national constitution. The states and local governments are left with 
the powers to collect other fees. The main types of tax revenue for the federal and 
sub-national government are listed in Table 1. Nigeria’s local governments have 
autonomy to perform their functions in line with the constitution. However, the 
autonomy of local governments is not absolute. They retain their functions and 
fiscal relations with states and federal government.
Table 1  Nigeria’s Federal, State and Local Tax Jurisdiction and Assignment
Tax Legal 
Jurisdiction Collection Retention
Import duties Federal Federal Federation 
Account
Excise duties Federal Federal Federation 
Account
Export duties Federal Federal Federation 
Account
Mining rents & royalty Federal Federal Federation 
Account
Petroleum profits tax Federal Federal Federation 
Account
Capital gains tax Federal State State
Personal income tax (other than 
listed in 8) Federal State State
Personal income tax: armed & 
police forces, external affairs 
officers, non-residents, residents of 
the Federal Capital Territory 
Federal Federal Federal
Value added tax (Sales tax before 
1994)2 Federal Federal /
State
Federal /
State30
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Company tax Federal Federal Federation 
Account
Stamp duties Federal State State
Gift tax Federal State State
Property tax and ratings State State/local State/local
Licenses and fees Local Local Local
Motor park dues Local Local Local
Motor vehicle State Local Local
Capital transfer tax (CTT) Federal State State
Pools betting and other betting taxes State State State
Entertainment tax State State State
Land registration and survey fees State State State
Market and trading license and fees State Local Local
Source:  (Anyanwu, 1995; Jimoh, 2003; Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitutions, 1963, 1979 and 
1999)
Although the tax types have remained virtually unchanged since independence, 
a number of changes had occurred with respect to who has right to revenues. For 
example, before 1959, regional governments have rights to 100% of mining rents 
and royalties but with production and exportation of oil in 1958, and following 
Raisman Commission recommendations, in 1959, this was to be distributed as 
follows: mineral region (50%), Federal (20%) and Distributable Pool Account, 
DPA, (30%). In addition, sales tax, to which states (or regions) hitherto had 100% 
right, was replaced by VAT in 1994 (Jimoh, 2003).
2.2 Taxation and Revenue Structure in nigeria
Over the last three decades, the sources of public revenue in Nigeria are proceeds 
from the sale of crude oil, taxes, levies, fines, tolls, penalties and charges. Oil 
revenues are the main source of public revenue, accounting for about 80% to 85% 
of the total (AfDB, UNECA, and OECD 2010). In the period 2001-09, oil revenues 
averaged 27% of GDP while tax revenues averaged 6.4%. Oil revenues have been 
volatile, ranging from 35.6% in 2001 to 19.6% in 2009 when oil prices dropped as 
a result of the global recession. In Africa, Nigeria like Algeria, Angola, Equatorial 
Guinea and Libya rely almost entirely on one single type of tax, unlike Kenya, 
South Africa and Mauritania which show a relatively balanced mix of different 
types of taxes.
The lion share of total Nigerian revenues is collected and retained by the 
federal government. For instance, between 1980 and 2008, about 93.9% of the Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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total Nigerian government revenues were collected by the federal government. 
This is not unexpected as the federal government is solely responsible for the 
collection of mining rights and royalties, petroleum profit tax (Nigeria’s major 
revenue source) and share VAT collection with state government. This implies 
that the local and state governments put together, collect less than 7% of Nigeria’s 
government revenues. 
The revenue profiles of the three tiers of government for the period 2003-2008 
are depicted in figures 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The bulk of the federal government 
revenue (over 70%) is from the federation account. In fact, federal government 
generates only about 6% independent revenue between 2003 and 2008. Similarly, 
internal generated revenue (IGR) efforts of states at 14% in the same period are 
generally very weak. State governments rely mainly on federal allocation, grants 
and proceed from excess crude account as their major sources of funding. Also, 
the structure of local government revenue follows the same trend exhibited by 
federal and states government. This weak drive for internally generated revenue 
by the three tiers of government is not conducive for economic growth and 
prosperity. 
Figure 1.  Revenue Structure of the Federal Government, 2003-2008
Sources:  CBN: Statistical Bulletin and Annual Report and Statement of Account (various issues). 32
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Figure 2.  Revenue Structure of State Government, 2003-2008
Sources:  CBN: Statistical Bulletin and Annual Report and Statement of Account (various issues).
Figure 3.  Revenue Structure of Local Government in Nigeria, 2003-2008
Sources:  CBN: Statistical Bulletin and Annual Report and Statement of Account (various issues).Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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Tax administration and revenue collection functions are performed by different 
institutions at the three tiers of government. At the federal level, Federal Ministry 
of Finance; the Federal Inland Revenue Service and the Nigeria Customs Service 
are responsible for the administration of tax laws and revenue collection. The 
Joint Tax Board is responsible for harmonising the relationship between tax 
authorities at the federal and state levels. The National Revenue Mobilisation, 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission propose the remuneration of political and 
judicial office-holders, and also advise on the allocation of revenues among the 
three tiers of government. The state’s Board of Internal Revenue and Ministry 
of Finance are responsible for tax administration at the state level. The revenue 
committee for local governments and Finance and Supply Department are 
responsible for tax matters at the local government level.
Efficiency and effectiveness of Nigeria’s tax system over the years has been faced 
with a number of challenges. These challenges include: 
(i)  Tax Administration and administrative challenges; these include inadequate 
personnel and institutional capacity to administer taxes effectively. The 
use of poorly trained staff with inadequate technical and administrative 
competences is not uncommon especially at the local government level.
(ii)  Compliance challenges; The failure of employers to keep accurate records 
and remit all personal income tax (PIT) to relevant authorities remains a 
challenge in spite penalties and the payment of all tax arrears by defaulters. 
Also some business concerns keep different versions of record at times all 
certified by auditors. The correct version is different from the version for 
the tax authority. There is yet another robust version for the bank showing 
a buoyant business. Also, most tax-payers have limited ability of to keep 
accurate accounts and are ignorant on their tax responsibilities.
(iii)  Lack of reliable statistics on the various taxpayers is a major hindrance for 
the identification and assessment of taxpayers. This lack of data limits follow 
up to enforce collection. 
(iv)  Lack of equality especially in PIT is major problem of taxation in Nigeria. 
Self-employed outnumber paid workers and they earn as much as four times 
that of the formal sector employees, the bulk of PIT is paid by employees 
whose salaries are deducted at source (Mamud, 2008).
(v)  There are over 500 different taxes and levies imposed by various tiers of 
government in Nigeria instead of only those approved by Taxes and Levies 
(Approved list of Collection) Act. The multiplicity of tax-imposing and tax-
collecting structures drives up the cost of doing business and destroys investor 
confidence. In fact, the World Bank Doing Business Report, 2010, ranked 34
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Nigeria 132nd out of 183 countries with regard to the ease of paying taxes. 
Multiple taxation partly accounts for this low ranking (AfDB, UNECA, and 
OECD 2010). Multiple taxation is more common in the Local Government 
Councils.
(vi)  Fraud and Corruption on the part of tax-collecting institutions is an issue 
that needs to be addressed. Revenue Collectors still engage in fraudulent 
practices, in spite of the various control measures and the presence of 
Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC), and the Economic and 
Financial crime Commision (EFCC). 
In order to address the above challenges the federal government has adopted 
several measures. In 1986, following the introduction of the structural adjustment 
programme (SAP), tax reform undertaken includes, reviewing custom and excise 
duties, continuing with the reduction of company and income taxes, expanding 
the range of tax exemptions and rebates, introducing capital allowance, 
expanding the duty drawback scheme and manufacturing-in-bond scheme, 
abolishing excise duty (Mamud 2008). In 2002, the federal government of Nigeria 
inaugurated a Study Group (the SG) to review all aspects of the Nigerian Tax 
System and administration. The SG report and recommendations was further 
reviewed by a Working Group (the WG) inaugurated in 2004. 
Most of the legislation presented by government to the National Assembly as 
recommended by the SG and WG has been signed into laws. These include; Bill for 
an Act to establish the FIRS as an autonomous Service, Bill for an Act to amend 
the Companies Income Tax Act and Bill for an Act to amend the Petroleum 
Profit Tax. Following the recommendation of the WG, a new National Tax Policy 
(NTP) was approved by the Federal Government of Nigeria in January 2010, to 
provide a set of rules and guidelines that will regulate all stakeholders such as 
taxpayers, regulators, tax practitioners and legislator. The policy is also expected 
to uphold the application of fiscal federalism in the generation and expenditure 
of revenue by governments at all levels as stipulated by the Nigerian constitution. 
The policy will become fully operational following the passage into law by the 
National Assembly (Oji,2010).
Key highlights of the draft tax policy include: Avoidance of multiple taxation 
by the various tiers of government on income, property, imports, production 
and turnover; encourage the use of career tax administrators to collect tax as 
against the use of ad-hoc consultant or agents; more emphasis on direct taxation 
than indirect taxation coupled with an increase in the rate of VAT; reduction in Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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companies’ income tax from 30% to 20% and the top rate for PIT from 25% to 
17.5%. 
The proposed National tax policy though a major improvement over the existing 
strategic document still has some short comings. For example, the issue of non-
compliance of employers to register their employees and to remit such taxes to 
relevant authorities was not properly addressed in the new national tax policy. 
Besides, the policy is not very clear on how the challenge of multiplicity of taxes 
can be tackled by the three tiers of government. Nigeria’s active workforce is 
predominantly in the informal sector where collection of taxes is a critical 
challenge. The modalities for widening the tax base to effectively capture most 
of the informal sector and other potential tax payers needs to be given more 
consideration before the document is finally signed into law. Moreover, the 
greatest challenge of the new policy to a federal state like Nigeria is the ambiguity 
in tax jurisdiction. According to Sanni O. (2010), some state governments, like 
Lagos State not only faulted the new policy on the ground that all State Houses of 
Assembly powers will be usurped from legislating on tax matters but also raise 
objection to why the Federal Government is given the responsibility to charge 
fees like PIT and land use tax.
3. InTERgOvERnmEnTAl FISCAl RElATIOnS (FISCAl FEDERAlISm)
Globally, there are only 24 of the world’s 193 countries including four African 
countries namely Comoros, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa with clear federal 
constitutions. Other countries outside Africa that operates federal political 
systems includes America, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, India, 
Argentina, Brazil and Belgium. Iraq, Sudan, Sri Lanka and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) are either considering the option or are in transition 
to a federal system.
Fiscal Federalism is the inter-government fiscal relation as enshrined in a federal 
constitution provided for the functional responsibilities to be performed by the 
multi –levels of government and the financial resources that can be raised for 
provision of collective goods and services. Therefore, fiscal federalism recognizes 
that two or three government and not one central government must perform the 
role of the state in economic management, each level with different expenditure 
responsibilities and taxing powers. The federal system of administration is unique 
in that it allows both a centralized and decentralized collective choice. Fiscal 
federation places the economy at a higher utility level than a centralized system. 36
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(Okigbo, 1965; Anyanwu, 1996; Okunrounmu, 1996; Olusoji and Magbagbeola, 
1997; Devarajan, 2000; Inegbedion and Omoregie (2006); Buettner and Wildasin, 
2007; and Freinkman, 2007). 
Tella (1999) identifies two types of federalism namely, the dual federalism and 
the cooperative federalism. For the dual federalism, the constitution created two 
separate and independent tiers of government with their own clearly defined 
areas of responsibilities. In such a system, it is inevitable that a certain level 
of tension and competition would exist. Cooperative federalism, on the other 
hand, simply refers to making federalism work through cooperation between the 
various levels of government. It emphasizes the partnership between the different 
levels of government providing effective public services for the nation. This type 
of federalism is practiced in the United States of America and Germany. Nigeria 
too has been practicing cooperative federalism since the military incursion of 
1966. 
In the strong central government approach, the federal government retains the 
lion share of revenue and the state/ local governments have smaller share out of 
the federation account. In the decentralized approach, the federal government 
retains a lower share, with states and local governments having a larger share 
out of the federation account (Likita, 1999). On the other hand, confederation is 
a loose form of federalism that allows citizen from each region to maintain their 
primary allegiance to the region to which they belong. Confederation allows each 
region to retain and utilize revenue generated from within its jurisdiction (Okoh, 
2004). Earlier, Mbanefoh (1993) argues that, it may be practically impossible to 
satisfactorily balance the financial resources of a segment of a federation with 
the functions which it is expected to perform. This imbalance (Okeke 2004) 
concluded should not be regarded as result of federalism, but as a result of the 
disturbances of the equilibrium which ordinarily would allow the segments of 
the federation to carry out developmental programs that could be undertaken 
with the available internal resources.
Nigeria was incorporated in 1914 with the amalgamation of the two British 
protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria and the Crown Colony of 
Lagos into a single entity. The concept of fiscal federalism was first introduced 
in Nigeria in 1946 with the formation of a federation of three regions by splitting 
of the Southern Province to create the Eastern and Western Regions, and the 
Northern Region which was a continuation of the Northern Province, following 
the adopting of the Richards Constitution. Each of the three regions (East, West 
and North) has its own revenue base with a relatively weak federal government Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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(Barkan et al, 2001; Vincent, 2002). The Nigerian federal system metamorphosed 
thereafter from a two-tiered federal arrangement initially comprising three 
unequal political and administrative regions to the current three tiered federal 
system of 36 states, one Federal Capital Territory and 774 Local Governments. 
Before the military took over government in 1966, the regions were powerful 
and autonomous, especially as they generated most of their revenue from 
independent sources. Nowadays, the sub-national governments are totally 
dependent on federally collected revenues (Barkan et al, 2001; Mfor, 2009). 
According to Nwabuese (1983), true federalism presupposes that the national 
and regional governments should stand to each other in a relation of meaningful 
independence resting upon a balanced division of powers and resources. 
Conversely, most analysts including Vincent (2002) are of the opinion that 
Nigeria stopped operating a truly federal system of government in January 
1966 in favour a unitary system of government. In July 2010, the Nigeria’s 1999 
constitution was amended. Unfortunately, expected changes especially the issues 
“true federalism” were not made. 
One thing that can make or mar the corporate existence of Nigeria is the status 
of oil producing states. The way and form of allocating funds to oil producing 
areas from the federation account is very controversial. The establishment 
of the defunct Oil and Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Commission (that replaced OMPADEC 
in 1999) and the recently established ministry of Niger Delta in 2008, has not 
fully resolve the agitation for more shares of national revenue by oil producing 
areas in the Niger Delta nor ameliorate the deplorable conditions in their area. 
Government established federation account in order to disburse the funds to 
the bonafide beneficiaries (Federal, State and Local Governments) in line with 
the constitution and approved revenue allocation formula. The disbursement 
of this fund is done by the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC). 
FAAC made up of Minister of States for Finance (Chair), Accountant general 
of the Federation, Commissioners of Finance of the 36 states of the federation 
and representatives of other institutions meets monthly. The Revenue 
Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) established in 
1989 is constitutionally charged with the responsibility of ensuring that this 
disbursement exercise is accurate, fair and transparent (RMAFC, 2003). 38
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4. ExPEnDITuRE ASSIgnmEnT AnD REvEnuE AllOCATIOn In nIgERIA
4.1 Expenditure Assignment
All the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria allocated function to be 
performed by each level of government. The 1963 Federal Constitution allocated 
the functions to be performed by the federal and regional government under 
two main headings. That is, the exclusive federal and concurrent legislative list. 
In 1963 constitution, the local government was treated implicitly as part of the 
regional governments. The 1979, 1989 and 1999 federal constitution identified 
functions of each level of the federation. These functions are:
(i)  Exclusive list: These are function to be performed solely by the federal 
government. These functions include: external affairs, issue of legal tender 
currency, police, defense accounts of government of the federation etc.
(ii)  Concurrent legislative list: These are those to be performed by federal 
and state/ regional governments. These include census, higher education, 
industrial development prisons, National Parks and Antiquities etc.
(iii) Functions of Local Government: The functions and roles of the local 
government are listed in the fourth schedule of the 1979, 1989 and 1999 
federal constitutions. The main functions of local governments are provision 
of public goods, cemetery, refuse disposal public convenience, naming of 
roads, streets and house numbering, licensing, regulation and control of the 
sale of liquor, collection of rate, radio and television license etc.
However, under the military administration, the functions of each tier of 
government are not clearly defined. The function of each level of government 
depends on the Head of State and Commander-in-chief of the Armed forces. The 
military governments rely on decrees and various ad-hoc provisions to assign 
responsibilities. Even under the civilian dispensation, the local governments are 
still subject to varying degrees of state oversight and control, even though their 
functions are specified in the Fourth Schedule. The local government authorities 
(LGAs) can exercise their authority only in accordance with enabling legislation 
passed by the states. 
Furthermore, most of the powers accorded to the states in the Second 
Schedule of the 1999 constitution are exercised concurrently with the federal 
government. However, there is the confusion over which tier of government, 
federal or state, is best equipped to deal with various areas of policy. At the 
moment, the federal and states government complement each other in the area of Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
39
provision of health and education. In practice, the functions on the concurrent 
list lead to wasteful duplication and inter-unit competition which hinder the 
effective functioning of the federal structure (Barkan et al, 2001; UNDP, 2009).
4.2 Revenue Sharing Arrangements in nigeria
Revenue allocation refers to the redistribution of fiscal capacity between the 
various levels of government, or the disposition of fiscal responsibilities between 
tiers of government. Revenue sharing arrangement is at two levels: One, the vertical 
allocation- among federal, state and local councils- two, horizontal allocation, 
among the states and the local governments. Revenue allocation is meant to 
attain two broad objectives, namely, efficiency and equity. Revenue allocation, 
in Nigeria commenced under the Richard Constitution of 1946. Thereafter, there 
were over nine fiscal commissions, six military decrees and one act of parliament 
to design appropriate tax assignment and revenue allocation formulae including: 
the Hicks-Phillipson Commission (1951), Chick’s Commission (1953), Raisman 
Commission of 1958, Binns Commission (1964) Dina Commission (1968), 
Aboyade Technical Committee (1972), Okigbo Commission (1980) and Danjuma 
Commission 1988 (Salami, 2007). The recommendations of all the commissions 
were all based on the need to have equitable and balanced horizontal and vertical 
allocation for the country. 
Nigeria’s fiscal arrangement has been guided by the country’s constitution. 
For example, Section 162(1) of the constitution states that the federation shall 
maintain a special account to be called the “Federation Account” into which 
are paid all revenues collected by the government of the federation. All funds 
standing to the credit of the Federation Account must be distributed among the 
federal, the state governments and the local government councils on such term 
and manner prescribed by the National Assembly. Proceeds from the PIT of 
members of the armed forces, the Nigerian Police Force and the External Affairs 
Ministry and residents of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja are, few exceptions 
of revenue not paid into the federation account in line with the constitution. The 
allocation formula is guided by certain allocation principles like population (and 
population density), equality of states, internal revenue generation, and land-
mass and principle of derivation. 
Since 1989 when the National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and 
Fiscal Commission was established, revenue allocation among states/local 
governments has been based on the following principles: equality, population, 
social development, internally generated revenue and land mass/terrain. The 40
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importance attached to each of these principles is reflected in the weight given to 
each principle. 
The principles represent the factors that govern the application of revenue 
allocation such as population, derivation, Landmass, national interest. The 
formula refers to their relative weight attached to each principle.
Derivation principle. The principle believes that revenue in the federation account 
should be allocated on the basis of each state’s contribution to total revenue. 
That is, all revenue which can be identified as having come from, or can be 
attributed to, a particular region or state should be allocated to it (Phillips, 1971). 
This principle was attacked because it makes rich states richer since the more 
developed states will contribute more to the federation account, starving needy 
states of developmental funds. It can therefore, leads to greater disparity among 
states and the consequent instability within the country.
Principle of need. The principle advocated that states are not equally endowed 
with resources, some states are more populated and developed than others, and 
therefore, more resources should be given to the less developed states to bridge 
the gap in development. 
Principle of National Interest. The principle is based on the importance attached to 
developing all states to increase progress and sense of belonging. It will promote 
national unity by sharing the revenue in the federation account equally among 
States. This formula was to strike a balance between equity, and needs of national 
economic/ political growth leading to stability.
Principle of Independent Revenues. This principle advocates that states can 
introduce or charge revenue yielding taxes within the state as long as it is a stable 
source of revenue but must conform with the principles of taxation within the 
economy and take into consideration national interest.
4.3.1 vertical allocation of federally collected revenues
The Federal Government retains some of the federally collected revenues as its 
independent revenues and balance of the federally collected revenues is to be 
paid into the Federation Account for distribution among tiers of government 
in accordance with an agreed formula. Before independence, the regional 
government allocation was more than that of the Federal Government. The 
sharing formula in 1958 as recommended by Raisman commission was 40:60 in Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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favor of region. Thereafter and up till today, federal government is allocated the 
highest share of the federally collected revenues. 
However, the Federal Government’s share has been on the decline in favor of 
lower tiers of government. In 1992 the vertical allocation was changed to 48.5%, 
24% and 20% for federal, state and local government respectively. Special funds 
accounted for 7.5 %. The current vertical allocation (without the special funds) 
with effect from 2002 is 52.68%, 26.72% and 20.60% for federal, state and local 
government respectively. Anderson (2007) observed that at less than 53% of 
total government spending (after all transfers to the states), Nigeria is more 
decentralized than in Brazil, Malaysia and Venezuela. On the other hand, some 
federations are still more decentralized than Nigeria like Belgium, Canada, 
Germany and Switzerland, where the federal government accounts for between 
30 and 40% of direct government spending.
The derivation account phased out by the Military regime was re-established in 
1999. The account was as high as 50 % in 1958. Presently, the derivation account 
is 13 % of the revenues obtained from oil produced on-shore, that is on the 
land areas of each of the nine oil producing states, namely; Abia, Akwa Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers, Imo, Ondo. Nigeria is perhaps the only 
known federation that applies derivation principle to federal oil revenues. India 
and Russia for example make minor special transfers to the producing states. 
While countries like Mexico, Brazil, Australia, and the United States have no 
derivation principle (Anderson, 2007). The Federation Account excludes the 
derivation account. It also excludes the various federal government dedicated 
account that has first charge AFEM Surplus Account, Petroleum Trust Funds, 
National Priority Project Funds, External Service Funds, NNPC Joint Venture 
Payment Account, Educational Tax Funds are increasing. Consequent upon 
making provisions for all these funds and the derivation account, the balance of 
the total federally collected revenues paid into the federation account in 2008 is 
less than 60% , down from over 90% in 1970 (Table 3).42
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Table 3.  Federation Account as a Percentage of Federally–Collected Revenue
Year
Total federally 
collected revenue N 
million
Federation Account 
N million
Federation Account 
as Percentage of 
Federally Collected 
Revenue
1970 634 582 92
1975 5,515 5,294 96
1980 15,234 14,747 97
1985 15,050 13,750 91
1990 98,102 68,064 96
1995 459,987 170,523 38
2000 1,906,159 1,262,468 66
2005 5,597,500 3,203,300 57
2006 6,061,000 3,315,100 55
2007 5,715,600 3,878,500 68
2008 7,866,600 4,552,800 58
Sources:  CBN: Statistical Bulletin and Annual Report and Statement of Account (various Issues )
VAT introduced in 1994 to replace the Sales Tax also has a first charge to federally 
collected revenues and are paid into a special fund called the VAT Pool Account 
and subsequently shared among the three levels of government. The lion share of 
the VAT allocation formula goes to the federal government. Currently, the federal 
government is allocated (40%), state governments (35%) and Local governments 
(25%)1.
4.3.2 horizontal Allocation among federating States and local governments
Horizontal allocation among state and local government councils in Nigeria 
favored states with large land areas, large number of councils, high population 
and in some instances derivation principle. Prior to 1964, derivation was given 
the greatest weight 50% in horizontal revenue allocation. The balance was shared 
among the region based on the principle of equality of state (50%) and population 
(50%). Between 1964 and 1976, there was no derivation, the principle of equality 
of state and population were still given equal weights of 50 % in the allocation of 
revenues among the states. Between 1977 and 1981, equal access to development 
1  See section 2.2 for the share of VAT in revenue generated by the federal and sub-national 
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opportunities has a weight of 25 %, national minimum standard 22 %, absorptive 
capacity 20 %, independent revenue efforts 18 % and fiscal efficiency 15 %. 
Figure 4.  Federal Allocation Among States 2008 N Billion
Sources:  CBN Annual Report and Statement of Account 200844
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Between 1982 and 1998, equality of states has a weight of 40 %, population 30 
%, independent revenue efforts 10 %, land mass and terrain 10 % and social 
development 10 %. From 1999, equality of state had the highest weight of 40 % 
under horizontal allocation among the states. This is followed by population, 30 
%. The balance of 30 % is being shared by social development factor, 10 %; land 
mass, 10 % and internal revenue effort 10 % respectively. Annex 2 highlights the 
horizontal allocation in Nigeria from 1969 to date. For the distribution of VAT 
proceeds among states and local governments the indices are derivation (20 %), 
equality (50 %) and population (30 %). The horizontal distribution formula had 
remained stable since 1981, except, for the increase in derivation principle for 
mineral revenue to 13 % in 1999 to the following Nigeria’s nine oil-producing. 
As a result, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Bayelsa and Ondo, all oil producing states 
received the highest amount from the federation account in 2008 (See figure 4). 
This has been the trend for the past 8 years. However, the revenues allocated 
to oil producing areas over the years are not sufficient to remedy the negative 
externalities of oil production let alone grant them access to equal opportunities 
for development with other states of Nigeria. Therefore, the persistent restiveness 
in the oil producing areas for sometimes now (Vincent, 2002; Jimoh, 2003).
5.   ChAllEngES OF FISCAl FEDERAlISm AnD  
REvEnuE AllOCATIOn In nIgERIA
The current revenue allocation formula allocates more funds to the federal 
government at the detriment of the states and local government. Secondly, the 
system discourages strive for an increased Internally Generated Revenue (IGR). 
This is because most state wait for allocation from federation account without 
much effort at getting increased level of IGR. Furthermore, the allocation to the 
LGAs are reallocated in most states by a committee namely, State Joint Allocation 
Committee (JAC). This is unconstitutional and an aberration that needs to be 
discouraged. 
Besides, the fiscal system in Nigeria grants minimal fiscal autonomy to the sub-
national governments in terms of revenue assignment as the major taxes such as 
company income tax, VAT, custom and excise duties, tax on petroleum products 
and education tax, are assigned to the federal government. The sub national 
governments lack financial autonomy especially during the military regimes. The 
Military incursion into governance in Nigeria distorts the built in mechanism in 
the constitution to address fiscal management problems. Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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With the advent of democratic dispensation in 1999 the situation has improved. 
For example, Barkan et al, (2001) discovered that local governments in few states of 
the federation such as Ogun, Nasarawa, Delta and Rivers States are now provided 
with complete or near complete financial autonomy. They no longer require prior 
approval of any contract, whatever its size, from any organ or functionary of the 
State Government provided that the project had received the prior approval of 
the Legislative Arm of the Local Government during the normal process of the 
annual budget exercise. Though a high degree of financial dependency on central 
government stifles federalism, it is important to note that an effective federal 
system does not require that sub-national governments have complete financial 
autonomy. In practice, fiscal imbalances also feature in most federations as in 
Brazil and Australia (See Boxes 1 and 2). 
Box 1: Brazil Federation
Brazil first adopted federal constitutions in 1889. A revolution in 1930 reduced the 
autonomy of Brazil’s states. That regime was overthrown by the military in 1945 
and the federal system was reinstalled, along with an electoral system that included 
competitive nation-wide parties for the first time in the history of the republic. The 
military regime that took power in 1964 kept an emasculated form of the federal 
system, but democracy returned in 1985 and the new federal government allowed 
direct elections for the state governments. The 27 states (including a Federal District) 
and 5,559 municipalities of Brazil have significant powers under its Constitution, 
which was produced by a constitutional assembly in 1988. Three orders of government 
are recognized: central, state and municipal; and a process of fiscal and political 
decentralization was ushered in with the new constitution.
The division of revenues from Brazil’s state value added tax (VAT) and revenues 
from offshore oil resources among the three tiers of government is a challenge. 
The major challenge of the Brazilian government is to achieve consensus among 
Brazil’s constituent units on the sharing of wealth with the aim of reducing regional 
inequalities. Brazil’s federal VAT is fully creditable against the state VAT, with complex 
technical and Administrative problems relating to different VATs in different states 
and overlapping tax bases. The major concern of the Brazilian government includes 
increasing revenue autonomy and decreasing transfer dependency. However, vertical 
gap of sub-national governments is bridged by equalization transfer.46
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Box 2: Australia Federation
Australia which became a federation in 1901 currently has 6 States and 2 territories 
and approximately 774 local governments. The national government tax jurisdiction 
covers income taxes on individuals and businesses, sales tax, excise taxes, and taxes on 
international trade, which are Commonwealth taxes. The States’ taxes include taxes 
are on payrolls, financial and capital transactions, gambling, insurance, and motor 
vehicles. Local governments tax immovable property. There vertical and horizontal 
fiscal imbalance in Australia as the states depend upon transfers from the central 
government to finance their own expenditure responsibilities. Government put in 
place inter-governmental transfers to sub-national government through equalization 
arrangements to deal with these vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances between 
the states through specific grants, specific purpose payments and block grants from 
the federal to states and local governments. Tax system in Australia also includes 
a federal VAT levied throughout the country, which is distributed to the states 
through an equalization grant. Key issues of concern in Australia’s federal system 
are reorganization of Australia’s hospital funding and health care system and 
amendments to the Goods and Services Tax, among others.
Another area of concern is the use of land mass and population for computing 
horizontal revenue allocation formulae. This principle is biased in favor of states 
with wide land mass and thin population. The equality principle may not be 
appropriate in Nigeria as the states differ in terms of resources endowment, 
existing capital formation, e.tc.
6. COnCluSIOnS AnD POlICY RECOmmEnDATIOnS
This paper has examined the issue of taxation and fiscal federalism in Nigeria. 
Nigeria’s expenditure assignment, tax jurisdiction and revenue allocation is 
disproportionately in favor of federal government despite the recent tax reforms 
and constitutional amendments. Each level of government should be made to be 
autonomous. The local government should not be made to depend on state and 
federal government. The State Joint Allocation Committee should be abolished. 
The internal revenue sources of local and state government have not been fully 
exploited. Therefore, concerted effort should be made to boost the internal 
revenue of the local and state government. 
A review of the current revenue sharing formulae to give weight to each tier of 
government based on the function they perform is imperative. Conflicts, waste Taxation, Revenue Allocation, and Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria
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and inefficiencies as a result of duplication of services such as primary and 
secondary education, primary and secondary healthcare services, and water and 
sanitation services provided by the sub-national government as well as federal 
government needs to be eliminated especially with the adoption of a cooperative 
approach to governance. As recommended by Carling (2006), the problems of 
vertical imbalance can also be corrected from either the expenditure side—by 
substantially narrowing the states’ expenditure responsibilities to fit their limited 
revenue bases—or from the revenue side—by substantially broadening the states’ 
revenue autonomy and reducing their dependence on commonwealth grants/ 
federal allocation
The persistent agitation for resource control especially by Niger Delta needs to 
be given urgent attention. Furthermore, government commitment to high level 
of technical training and capacity building of tax and revenue officials and 
constant public enlightenment will increase compliance and boost taxation drive 
by the three tiers of government. As stipulated in the tax proposed tax policy, 
the use of tax consultants should be discouraged. Tax consultant may only be 
used in circumstances where there is deficiency in technical skills and required 
manpower. Finally, for the new tax policy to have a significant impact on the 
revenue and economic development of Nigeria, the endemic corruption and 
leakages in the tax administration should be eliminated. 
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AnnEx 1:  
vERTICAl AllOCATIOn OF ThE FEDERATIOn ACCOunT, 1981 – TIll DATE
Recipients 1960-
1962
1963-
1966
1981 
Act
1984 
Jan. 1990 Jan. 
1992 
June 
1992  June 
2002 
till 
Date*
1.  Statutory Allocation Formula (%)
(i) Federal Government  70 65 55% 55%  50% 50% 48.5%  48.5%  52.68
(ii) State Government  30 35 30.5% 32.5% 30% 25% 24% 24% 26.72
(iii) Local Government  10% 10% 15% 20% 20%  20%  20.60
(iv) Special Funds 4.5 2.5% 5% 5% 7.5%  7.5%  -
(a) Federal Capital 
Territory 1% 1% 1% 1% -
(b) Stabilization 0.5% 0.5%  0.5%  0.5% -
(c) Savings 0% 0% 0% 0% -
(d) Derivation  2% 2%b 1% 1% 1% 1% -
(e) Dev of oil mineral 
producing areas  1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 3% 3% -
(f) General cology  1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
2.  Value Added Tax
Federal 80 40
State 20 35
Local Govt 0 25
*  Without the special funds
Source:  (Anyanwu, 1995; Jimoh, 2003; RMAFC database)
AnnEx 2:  
hORIzOnTAl REvEnuE AllOCATIOn FORmulAE (AmOng STATES)  
In nIgERIA (%)
Criteria . 1969-76 1976-
1981
From 
1982 
January 
1990
1999- 
todate
(i) Minimum Responsibilities of 
Government (Equality of States)  50.0 - 40.0 40.0 40.0
(ii) Population 50.0 - 40.0 30.0 30.0
Equal access to Dev. Opportunities - 25.0 - - -
Nat’nal min.standard for Nat’nal Integration - 22.0 - - -
Absorptive capability - 20.0 - - -
Fiscal efficiency - 15.0 - - -
(iii) Social Development Factor  - - 15.0 10.0  10.0 
(a) Primary school enrolment of which 
-direct enrolment - - 11.25 - -
-inverse enrolment - - 3.75 - -
(b) Education - - - 4.0 4.0
(c) Health - - - 3.0  3.0 
(d) Water - - - 3.0 3.0
(iv) Landmass and Terrain - - - 10.0
(v) Internal Revenue Effort - 18.0 5.0 10.0 20.0
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source:  (Anyanwu, 1995; Jimoh, 2003; RMAFC databases)
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